Linking developing country's cooperation on climate control with industrialized country's R&D and technology transfer by Kemfert, Claudia & Zhang, ZhongXiang
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Linking developing country’s cooperation
on climate control with industrialized
country’s R&D and technology transfer
Claudia Kemfert and ZhongXiang Zhang
University of Oldenburg, Germany, East-West Center, USA
July 2003
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41473/
MPRA Paper No. 41473, posted 24. September 2012 02:34 UTC
July 2003 
 
 
Linking Developing Country’s Cooperation on Climate Control 
With Industrialized Country’s R&D and Technology Transfer 
 
 
Claudia Kemfert
a
 and ZhongXiang Zhang
b, 
 
 
a
 Department of Economics 
University of Oldenburg  
D- 26111 Oldenburg 
Germany 
Tel: +49 441 798 4106 
Fax: +49 441 798 4101 
Email: kemfert@uni-oldenburg.de 
 
 
 
b
 Research Program 
East-West Center 
1601 East-West Road 
Honolulu, HI 96848-1601 
USA 
Tel: +1-808-944 7265 
Fax: +1-808-944 7298 
Email: ZhangZ@EastWestCenter.org  
 
                                                 

Corresponding author. 
 2 
Abstract  
 
Using a world multi-sectoral, multi-regional trade model, this paper has investigated the 
economic and environmental implications of climate control coalitions cooperating on R&D 
investment that triggers low cost environmentally friendly technologies. We start with the Kyoto 
scenario where all Annex B industrialized countries (including the US) are assumed to 
individually meet their mandatory Kyoto greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets. Next, we 
consider industrialized country’s cooperating on climate control and R&D-induced technological 
innovations. We then expand climate control coalition to include developing countries. Finally, 
we investigate the implications of additional R&D investment from industrialized countries to 
developing countries. Our results clearly demonstrate that cooperation on climate control and 
R&D among industrialized countries induces technological innovations, lowers their compliance 
costs and thus places less strong economic burden on these countries. But without developing 
countries getting involved in climate control and R&D investment, such a cooperation alone is 
unable to completely offset negative economic effects of the emissions reduction commitments 
on both industrialized countries themselves and developing countries. Recognizing the 
importance of developing countries’ participation and their legitimate demand for adequate 
technology transfer and financing, the paper concludes that linking developing country’s 
cooperation on climate control with industrialized country’s R&D and technology transfer would 
produce win-win-win outcomes for both developing countries and industrialized countries and for 
the global environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
March 2001, the President Bush changed his mind about a campaign pledge to regulate carbon 
dioxide. Soon after, he thought the Kyoto Protocol “fatally flawed”, and decided the US 
withdrawal from the Protocol on the grounds that it would be harmful to the nation and does not 
impose any restrictions on emission of greenhouse gases by developing nations. Nevertheless, he 
insisted last June that climate change was a serious problem, and promised to propose an 
alternative. Nearly one year after pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol, he finally announced his 
long-awaited, domestic climate plan on February 14, 2002. 
 
The Bush plan represents a welcome step forward, because it signals that the U.S. recognizes the 
importance to take action against climate change. This is particularly significant, given the 
President decision to reject the Protocol. Moreover, by explicitly putting forward an intensity 
target, it provides a reference against which to measure the U.S. has made progress in controlling 
the growth of emissions. However, the plan does not offer a credible reply to the Bush 
administration’s critique that Kyoto Protocol failed to require developing countries’ participation, 
which led the administration to pull out of the Protocol. What are alternatives? 
 
Is it possible to offer a framework in such a way that can provide incentive for cooperation 
between industrialized countries and developing countries on climate control? To address this 
question, we have to know what is the most challenging issue in international climate change 
negotiations. On the one hand, given that developing countries represent rapidly growing 
greenhouse gas emissions sources in line with their industrialization and urbanization, 
industrialized countries insist that developing countries should take on commitments. On the 
other hand, developing countries argue that industrialized countries are responsible for the 
majority of both historical and current greenhouse gas emissions. They insist on legitimate 
demand for industrialized countries to provide adequate technology transfer and financing, if 
curbing greenhouse gas emissions requires special action on their part. 
 
In this paper, we aim to examine the linkage between R&D in industrialized countries and 
climate mitigation in developing countries to ascertain whether such a linkage provides incentives 
for cooperation between industrialized and developing countries on climate control. We assess 
the linkage using a world multi-sectoral, multi-regional trade model WIAGEM. Technical 
innovation is induced by knowledge accumulation. We assume that part of the technological 
benefits are a global public good. Not only the innovating country but all other countries enjoy 
positive spillover effects through international trade and capital flows. On the other hand, we treat 
part of them as a club good that is only appropriated by the members. Non-members are only able 
to attain such benefits if they are willing to cooperate with the members on climate control. In our 
context, if developing countries cooperate on climate control, they can attain the R&D 
cooperation benefits. As such, developing countries are able to cut their baseline greenhouse gas 
emissions, and industrialized countries can count these reductions credits towards their emissions 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Linking developing country’s cooperation on climate control 
with industrialized country’s R&D and technology transfer could prove to be win-win outcomes 
for both developing countries and industrialized countries. The former get increased access to 
more advanced energy efficiency and pollution control technologies, thus accelerating their future 
development along a more sustainable path, while the latter are able to meet their Kyoto 
commitments at a lower overall cost than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
 4 
This study differs from earlier economic studies in two important aspects. First, no global multi-
regional trade (MRT) models have incorporated R&D-induced technological changes as our 
model has done. Second, our scenarios examined are unique, and to our knowledge this is the first 
study to examine implications of industrialized countries investing in developing countries via 
R&D. This will allow us to investigate the contribution of enhanced R&D in developing 
countries to increasing GDP growth in developing countries and lowering Annex B country’s 
compliance costs. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses international climate control 
coalitions, pointing out that R&D cooperation could be an effective strategy for inducing climate 
change cooperation. The third section illustrates the applied modeling concept WIAGEM, with 
the mathematical description of endogenous technological change given in Appendix. The fourth 
section describes the policy scenarios examined, whereas the fifth section discusses all the 
simulation outcomes. The paper ends with the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. International Climate Control Coalitions 
 
The greatest success of international climate control policy was the establishment of the Kyoto 
Protocol. It is one of the leading and most important international environmental agreements in 
the history of global negotiation and bargaining policies. However, recent climate change 
negotiation processes confirm that the initial climate change control coalition was not stable: the 
United States, the world’s largest economy and emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) left the 
coalition and now acts as a free rider. The reason for this behavior can be explained by game 
theoretic validation. Economic payoffs to free ride are higher than joining coalitions.
1
 
 
Cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must be voluntary, as there is no international 
authority to enforce action. Extensive economic literature on game-theoretic approaches to 
international cooperation that address climate change has been produced since the early nineties 
(Barrett, 1992, 1995; Carraro, 1999, 2000; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992, 1993; Cesar, 1994; 
Chander, Parkash and Tulkens, 2001; Chander et al., 1999; Courtois, et al., 2001; Endres and 
Finus, 1998; Finus, 2000; Finus and Rundshagen, 2001; Hoel, 1994; Kemfert, 2001a, 2002b; 
Kemfert et al., 2002).  
 
Unfortunately, cooperation can also increase the incentive for each country to free ride when not 
fulfilling its commitment.  If the marginal benefits of additional emissions reductions decline, 
each country gains the benefits of emissions reduction implemented by others and reaps fewer 
benefits from its own actions. Although the rules adopted for the Kyoto Protocol include 
penalties for non-compliance, they may be difficult to enforce.
2
 From the aforementioned game-
theoretic literature, the following conclusions can be derived:  
 
                                                 
1
 The recent announcement (February 14
th
, 2002) by the US administration proposes a voluntary environmental 
program avoiding huge economic losses resulting from economic growth reductions. 
2
 An Annex B Party not meeting its commitment can be penalized 1.3 permits from its allocation for the next 
commitment period for each ton of excess emissions. However, a penalized country can threaten to withdraw from 
the protocol.  In practice, the penalties, if any, are likely to be negotiated. 
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 A global, self-enforcing agreement that is stable and profitable3 to all signatories4 is 
highly unlikely.  
 Self-enforcing international environmental agreements are likely to include a limited 
number of countries.  
 An equilibrium is likely to consist of multiple agreements of different size and with 
different commitments.  
 Equity and efficiency cannot be separated because the number of signatories affects the 
compliance costs each member bears. Compliance costs, in turn, affect the number of 
signatories (Carraro, 2000). 
 The existence of stable agreements depends on leakage, i.e. increased economic activity 
and emissions by non-members resulting from emissions reduction action by members.  
Leakage reduces the environmental benefits due to cooperation, creating an increased 
incentive to free ride.
5
 
 
Based on the game theory literature, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is not surprising, 
especially since it considered the cost of participation to be high. The adoption of low-cost 
unilateral action or formation of a separate agreement (e.g. NAFTA) would be consistent with the 
game theory literature. 
 
A variety of incentives exist for free riders or unstable coalition partners to join or remain in the 
game. These include transfers (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel, 1994), issue linkage (Folmer 
and van Mouche, 1993; Folmer, van Mouche and Ragland, 1993; Gil and Folmer, 1998; Barrett, 
1995; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995; Mohr, 1995), legal enforcement through third-party 
arbitration (Barrett, 1992), matching (Barrett, 1995; Guttman, 1978, 1987), self-enforcing 
strategies (Barrett, 1994b; Endres and Finus, 1998), social norms (Hoel and Schneider, 1997), tit-
for-tat (Cesar, 1994), trigger strategies (Barrett, 1994a; Cesar, 1994), and unilateral action 
(Barrett, 1995; Hoel, 1991). 
 
Comparing different incentive approaches, the best strategy for increasing the number of 
participants and/or emissions reductions and ensuring compliance with commitments appears to 
be transfers and issue linkage. Unilateral action does not prevent free riding and may lead to 
increased levels of emissions. With trigger strategies, penalties must be effective and hence are 
not suitable for a self-enforcing agreement; they are furthermore not renegotiation-proof. Legal 
enforcement is not feasible where the participants are sovereign nations. Matching, over time, 
leads all countries to behave in the same manner as the country making the least effort in 
reducing emissions. Tit-for-tat has been shown to be highly effective, especially if participants in 
a game are likely to meet again (Axelrod, 1984). But governments may not maintain tit-for-tat 
strategies for climate policy if other policy priorities arise. While social norms may reduce free 
riding, they differ across countries and may not be effective in ensuring compliance. 
                                                 
3
 An agreement is profitable if welfare is higher with the agreement than without the agreement. 
4
 An agreement is stable if none of the members has an incentive to leave and no non-member has an incentive to 
join. An agreement must be profitable to be stable (Bosello et al., 2001). 
5
 Paltsev (2001, p. 55) reports leakage of 5% to 15% depending upon assumptions about fossil fuel supply elasticities 
and trade substitution possibilities. This compares with leakage rates of 5% for GREEN, 8% for G-Cubed, 9% for 
GTEM, 11% for Gemini-E3, 14% for Worldscan, 26% for MS-MRT and 34% for MERGE when each country, 
including the United States, must meet its Kyoto Protocol target domestically. International emissions trading 
reduces the leakage rate approximately by half. The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol would decrease leakage 
by reducing the marginal cost of compliance. 
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If an agreement is profitable, there is a net gain to the members. In principle, this net gain can be 
distributed so that each adherent is a net beneficiary and thus attracts new members. Transfers 
can take the form of differential emissions reduction commitments with emissions trading 
mechanisms, such as those established by the Kyoto Protocol. A stable global agreement requires 
a policy mix that couples global emissions trading with a transfer mechanism designed to offset 
ex-post incentives to free ride (Bosello et al., 2001). Transfers to the United States to induce it to 
adopt more stringent emissions targets are not considered by Kyoto Protocol parties, since this 
would require renegotiation of the Protocol to accommodate the United States. 
 
If countries that do not benefit from an environmental agreement benefit from agreements on 
another issue and vice versa, linking agreements on two or more issues may enable countries to 
advance their joint interests on multiple issues at the same time, thus creating more room for 
mutual consensus than what would be possible on any single issue. In principle, issue linkage can 
improve both profitability and stability. Suggested links to climate change include trade (Barrett, 
1992, 1995, 1997; Cesar, 1994; Conconi and Perroni, 2000; Kemfert, 2002b; Whalley, 1991), 
research and development (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995, 1997; Katsoulacos, 1997; Kemfert, 
2002b; Tol et al., 2000; Buchner et al., 2002), international debt (Mohr, 1995), and other 
environmental problems such as biodiversity (Barrett, 1994a), and trade sanctions (Batyabal, 
1995; Heister, 1993).
6
 Linkage is more likely to be successful when the benefits of the linked 
issue can be limited to the agreement participants, unlike environmental agreements which 
benefit all countries regardless of their participation. 
 
As links with other issues merely increase the possible set of solutions (Gil and Folmer, 1998), 
linkage does not necessarily lead to better outcomes.  Accordingly, studies examining potential 
links between climate change and international trade agreements conclude that such a link may or 
may not lead to participation by a larger number of countries.  Implementing trade sanctions on 
non-cooperating countries does not guarantee greater cooperation (Courtois et al., 2001). Kemfert 
(2002b) finds that, with one exception, trade sanctions against non-members do not provide a 
significant incentive to join an agreement. Conconi and Perroni (2000) find that the effect of 
linking trade and environmental agreements is ambiguous.
7
 Linking trade and environmental 
agreements helps if the environmental policy stakes are small relative to the welfare effects of 
trade policies. 
 
Moreover, imposing trade restrictions faces methodological and implementation challenge and 
legal uncertainty. Barrett (1994, 2001) states that trade restrictions are the most obvious 
enforcement mechanism for an international climate change agreement, but are difficult to apply 
for climate change due to the very large number of goods affected, the difficulty of calculating 
the appropriate border tax for each product, and likely inconsistency with international trade 
agreements.
8
 Aldy, Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) suggest tariffs or trade restrictions based emissions 
associated with production, including standards that place the production of non-members at a 
disadvantage. Measure of this sort boils down to the whole processes and production methods 
                                                 
6
 A strategy that links climate change to international debt is not considered. It is assumed that debt concessions by 
climate negotiating parties to the United States would be politically unacceptable even in return for more aggressive 
climate change targets given the high per capita income of the United States relative to the Kyoto Protocol parties. 
7
 They distinguish between issue linkage, where a country is free to participate in none, either, or both agreements, 
and issue tie-in, where a country must be a party to both or none of the agreements. 
8
 Barrett, 2000. 
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(PPMs) controversy.
9
 Under WTO rules, an imported product is not allowed to be treated 
differently to a “like product” (i.e., a product with the same physical characteristics) produced 
domestically, only on the ground of PPMs employed to produce the product, although recent 
WTO Appellate Body decisions on the Shrimp-Turtle dispute have cast doubt on these 
interpretations.
10
 
 
In searching for potential issues to be linked, a growing literature suggests that cooperation on 
research and development appears to be a more promising way of expanding cooperation on 
climate change. Tol et al. (2000) find that technology and capital transfers increase the incentives 
to cooperate. Kemfert (2002b) finds that full cooperation on climate change and technological 
innovation benefits all countries relative to unilateral action, although technological spill over 
effects reduce the effectiveness of this strategy. Buchner et al. (2002) find that linking R&D 
cooperation with cooperation on climate change control is profitable and guarantees the stability 
of the linked agreement.
11
 In summary, the literature suggests that R&D cooperation could be an 
effective strategy for inducing climate change cooperation. Trade measures are less likely to be 
effective. 
 
However, recent studies indicate that, despite the high profile of the climate change issue, most 
industrialized countries have scaled back their spending in mitigation-related R&D. This is not 
that surprising, because, given the nature of a public good, the knowledge obtained from basic 
research is likely to be under-provided if undertaken unilaterally. Thus, Barrett (2001) suggests 
that basic R&D is best supplied cooperatively. International commitments to provide R&D 
funding are not unprecedented. A good example is multilateral cooperation and funding for the 
international space station. 
 
The climate control coalition might want to induce the United States to adopt a more stringent 
greenhouse gas target. The US withdrawal and adoption of a unilateral target reduces the 
environmental benefits anticipated by the climate control coalition when they negotiated their 
commitments.  The US action also reduces the costs of meeting their commitments and raises 
concerns about adverse competitiveness impacts. 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules allow border tax adjustments for environmental taxes or 
charges on products (ozone-depleting substances) or physically incorporated inputs (chemicals in 
plastic products), but not on production processes (CO2 emissions) or non-physical incorporated 
inputs (energy used in production).  This means that border tax adjustments are not allowed for 
production processes or methods (PPMs) used in exporting countries.  However, the 
Shrimp/Turtle case seems to signal an development of the WTO towards dealing with the issue of 
PPMs.
12
 
 
                                                 
9
 In dealing with the whole PPMs controversy, a distinction is drawn between product-related PPMs and non-product 
related PPMs. Product-related PPMs refer to the characteristics of the final product, for example, the environmental 
impact of a product when it is used or disposed, whereas non-product related PPMs refer to the characteristics of the 
processes or methods in manufacturing a product or providing a service (OECD, 1997). 
10
 See Zhang (2004) and Zhang and Assunção (2002) for further discussions on the Shrimp-Turtle dispute and 
interactions between climate policies and trade policy. 
11
 These results are sensitive to the level of technological spillover assumed. 
12
 Vikhlyaev, 2001. 
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Some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) including CITES, the Montreal Protocol 
and the Basel Convention, define "specific" trade measures, usually against non-coalition 
countries.  The Montreal Protocol imposes trade restrictions on goods made with, but not 
containing, ozone-depleting substances.
13
  So far, no trade measure taken pursuant to an MEA has 
been challenged in the WTO by a non-party.  The legal ambiguity surrounding the possibility of 
such a challenge raises questions about the effectiveness of such measures.
14
  Buck and Verheyen 
(2001) conclude that trade sanctions which discriminate against goods or services from non-
coalition nations are very likely to be incompatible with WTO law.
15
 However, the economic 
effects of measures allowed under WTO law taken by countries willing to act on climate change 
will exert economic pressure on those falling behind on climate change. Buck and Verheyen 
(2001) conclude that: 
  
 product (e.g. energy efficiency) standards applied in a non-discriminatory way on 
imported and domestic products would be compatible with WTO law;  
 eco-labeling schemes which consider non-product-related environmental impacts of 
products would most likely violate WTO provisions;  
 procurement programs developed and implemented in the context of an MEA will not 
violate WTO law even if they include PPM-based technical specifications; and  
 trade restrictive environmental measures – including PPM-based measures – can be 
justified under the provisions of the GATT if such measures have been agreed to and 
negotiated on a multilateral basis. Trade disputes are more likely to arise from such 
national measures undertaken to fulfill obligations under an MEA rather than from the 
provisions of the MEA.
16
 
 
De Moor et al. (2002) note that President Bush has proposed $ 4.5 billion in research, suggesting 
that joint efforts in technology development could be a promising option for cooperation.
17
  
Barrett proposes:  
 
 collectively funded R&D (including developing countries based on UN assessment) and  
 coordinated adoption of national standards to drive adoption of lower emitting 
technologies.
18
 
 
In summary, there are several precedents for multilateral environmental agreements that specify 
trade measures to be taken against non-coalition countries. At least one agreement imposes trade 
restrictions based on production processes or methods. The WTO may be moving to greater 
acceptance of trade restrictions based on PPMs.  However, considerable legal uncertainty remains 
in all of these areas. It appears that the Kyoto Protocol parties could make amendments to include 
                                                 
13
 In other words, the Montreal Protocol imposes trade restrictions based on PPMs despite the fact that WTO rules do 
not allow border tax adjustments based on PPMs. 
 
14
 Vikhlyaev, 2001, p. 18. 
 
16
 Zhang and Assunçâo, 2002. 
 
17
 De Moor et al., 2002. 
 
18
 Barrett, 2000. 
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specific trade measures to be taken against non-coalition countries such as the United States, 
provided that they are related to climate change.  Those measures could include trade restrictions 
on specified products based on their method of production. 
 
 
3. The Model WIAGEM 
 
The analysis is performed using the WIAGEM model.  The multi regional model WIAGEM 
(World Integrated Assessment General Equilibrium Model) is an integrated economy-energy-
climate model that incorporates economic, energetic and climatic modules in an integrated 
assessment approach. In order to evaluate market and non–market costs and benefits of climate 
change, WIAGEM combines an economic approach with a special focus on the international 
energy market and integrates climate interrelations with temperature changes and sea level 
variations. The design of the model is focused on multilateral trade flows. That is why we think 
that the model is best suited for an investigation of cost and benefits through climate-related trade 
policies. The representation of the economic relations is based on an intertemporal general 
equilibrium approach and contains the international markets for oil, coal and gas. The model 
incorporates all greenhouse gases (GHG) which influence the potential global temperature, sea 
level variation and the assessed probable impacts in terms of costs and benefits of climate change. 
Market and non-market damages are evaluated according to the damage costs approaches of Tol 
(2001). Additionally, this model includes net changes in GHG emissions from sources and 
removals by sinks resulting from land use change and forest activities. 
 
Induced technological change is considered as follows (see Appendix for the mathematical 
description). Energy efficiency is improved endogenously by increased expenditures in R&D. 
This means that, in the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function, energy 
productivity is endogenously influenced by changes in R&D expenditures. The incentives to 
invest in technology innovations are market-driven. Because energy efficiency is improved by 
increased R&D expenditures, emissions reduction targets can be met with fewer production 
drawbacks. Furthermore, investment in R&D and technological innovation give a comparative 
advantage. The share of R&D expenditures in the total expenditures is endogenously determined 
by production changes, implying that investment in R&D expenditures competes with other 
expenditures (crowding out). Spillover effects of technological innovations are reflected through 
trade effects and capital flows. That means non-R&D-cooperating countries producing 
technological innovations can benefit from spillover effects through trade of technological 
innovations and capital flows that can be used for R&D investments. Model calculations show 
that capital flows increase to non-cooperating countries because of improved competitiveness 
effect and terms of trade effect. This consequently triggers spillover effects of technological 
innovations and energy efficiency improvements through increased R&D investments. Figure 1 
graphically explains the interrelations of economic activities, energy consumption, and climate 
and ecological impacts in WIAGEM.  
 
WIAGEM is an integrated assessment model combining an economy model based on a dynamic 
intertemporal general equilibrium approach with an energy market model and a climatic 
submodel. The model covers a time horizon of 50 years and solves in five-year time increments.
19
 
The basic idea behind this modeling approach is the evaluation of market and non-market impacts 
                                                 
19
 See Kemfert (2002b) for a detailed model description. 
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induced by climate change. The economy is represented by 25 world regions which are further 
aggregated to 11 trading regions for this study (see Table 1).  
 
 
Figure 1  Interrelations in WIAGEM 
 
 
 
Table 1  Definitions of countries and regions in WIAGEM 
Economy
25 world regions, 14 sectors
Energy market
Energy relatedGHG Emissions Non - Energy relatedGHG Emissions
Market Impacts Non Market Impacts
Climate: Temperature/ Sea Level
Welfare
Production/Consumption
Endogenous technological change
Ecological impacts
Protection costs
Energy Consumption
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 Regions 
ASIA India and other Asia (Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan) 
CHN  China 
CNA  Canada, New Zealand and Australia 
EU15  European Union  
JPN Japan 
LSA Latin America (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Rest of Latin America) 
MIDE  Middle East and North Africa 
REC Russia , Eastern and Central European Countries 
ROW  Other countries 
SSA  Sub Saharan Africa 
USA United States of America 
 
The economy of each region is disaggregated into 14 sectors, including five energy sectors - coal, 
natural gas, crude oil, petroleum and coal products, and electricity. Goods are produced for the 
domestic and export markets. The output of the non-energy sectors is aggregated into a non-
energy macro good. The production function for this macro good incorporates technology 
through transformation possibilities on the output side and constant elasticity substitution (CES) 
possibilities on the input side. The CES production structure combines a nested energy composite 
with a capital-labour-land composite at lower levels.  The energy composite is described by a 
CES function reflecting substitution possibilities for different fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas, and oil).  
Fossil fuels are produced from fuel-specific resources.  The energy-capital-labour-land composite 
is combined with material inputs to get the total output. 
 
A representative household in each region allocates lifetime income across consumption in 
different time periods to maximize lifetime utility. In each period, households choose between 
current consumption and future consumption, which can be purchased via savings. The trade-off 
between current consumption and savings is given by a constant intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution.  Domestic and imported varieties of the non-energy macro good are imperfect 
substitutes in each region as specified by a CES Armington aggregation function constrained to 
constant elasticities of substitution. 
 
Producers invest as long as the marginal return on investment equals the marginal cost of capital 
formation. The rates of return are determined by a uniform and endogenous world interest rate 
such that the marginal productivity of a unit of investment and a unit of consumption is equalized 
within and across regions. 
 
In addition to the non-energy macro good, oil, coal and gas are traded internationally.  The global 
oil market is characterized by imperfect competition to reflect the ability of the OPEC regions to 
use their market power to influence the market price.  Coal trades in a competitive global market 
and gas trades in competitive regional markets with prices determined by global or regional 
supply and demand. 
 
Energy-related greenhouse gas emissions occur as a result of energy consumption and production 
activities. The model includes three of the six greenhouse gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous dioxide (N2O). These gases are considered to 
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have the most influence on climate change over 50 year period covered by the model, so 
exclusion of the remaining three gases is not believed to alter the general insights from this 
analysis. 
 
The emissions limitation commitments of Annex B Parties are specified as regional emission 
limits for 2010 adjusted to reduced coverage of greenhouse gases by the model. Sink 
enhancement actions are assumed to have zero cost and to have a global potential of 464 MtC in 
2010. 
  
The climate submodel estimates the climatic changes due to the greenhouse gas emissions and 
estimates the associated market and non-market damages. The atmospheric concentrations of CO2, 
CH4 and N2O are based on the first atmospheric lifetime of each gas because of the 50 year time 
horizon of the model.  This means that the emissions remaining in the atmosphere are assumed to 
have an infinite lifetime.  The atmospheric concentrations affect radiative forcing, which 
influences the potential and actual surface temperature and the sea level.  Market and non-market 
damages associated with these impacts, expressed as changes to regional and global welfare, are 
calculated as a function of the potential temperature change, the change in regional GDP, and 
regional coastal protection costs. 
 
 
4. Formation of Policy Scenarios 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether developing countries would 
economically benefit from cooperation on climate control and R&D-induced technological 
innovations either by Annex B countries or by themselves. To that end, we examine the following 
one baseline scenario and four main policy scenarios using the WIAGEM model.  
 
Business-as-usual (or baseline) scenario: This scenario assumes no specific intervention to limit 
the rate of greenhouse gas emissions but does allow for anticipated changes in demographic, 
economic, industrial and technological developments as well as environmental policies not 
directly aimed at limiting greenhouse gas emissions. As such, emissions both for Annex B 
countries and non-Annex B countries are expected to continue to rise unconstrainedly. 
 
The Kyoto scenario: All Annex B countries (including the US) are assumed to individually meet 
their mandatory Kyoto GHG emissions reduction targets without any trading of emissions 
permits. No emissions targets are set for developing countries. 
 
The R&D scenario: All Annex B countries (including the US) are still required to meet the same 
commitments as under the Kyoto scenario, but we assume that these countries cooperate on R&D 
investments to maximize their joint welfare. This scenario is to examine the contribution of R&D 
to lowering Annex B country’s compliance cost, given that investments in R&D induce 
technological innovations and changes that offer potentials to reduce emissions at lower costs. 
 
The DEV&R&D scenario: We assume that developing countries also cooperate with Annex B 
countries on climate control and R&D measures. All countries both Annex B and non-Annex B 
developing countries maximize their joint welfare. 
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The R&D ITOD scenario: We assume that industrialized Annex B countries invest R&D, which 
would have otherwise been spent on their territories, in non-Annex B developing countries (DCs) 
via R&D investments. This will trigger improved energy efficiencies and low cost emissions 
reduction options in developing countries where there is great potential of emissions reductions 
but abatement costs are low in comparison with Annex B countries, thus leading to further 
emissions reductions in developing countries. The resulting emissions reductions in developing 
countries are in turn counted towards Annex B country’s targets so that the global emissions 
remain the same levels as that under the Kyoto scenario. This would spur the incentives for 
Annex B countries to invest in R&D in DCs. 
 
In the last four policy scenarios, we assume that no trading across countries is allowed. This 
treatment allows us to examine the effectiveness of R&D-induced technology innovations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Definition of policy scenarios 
  
Policy scenario Features 
Kyoto Kyoto Emissions reduction targets are imposed on all 
Annex B countries including the US  
R&D Annex B countries Cooperate on R&D-induced 
technological progress 
DEV & R&D Developing nations cooperate with Annex B countries 
on climate control and on R&D 
R&D ITOD Annex B countries invest in non-Annex B developing 
countries via R&D investments, with the resulting 
emissions reductions accounted in Annex B country’s 
emissions balance 
 
 
5. Simulation Results 
 
Table 3 and Figures 2-7 present the main simulation results. They speak themselves. Thus, in 
what follows, we just provide some brief explanation to help readers better understand these 
results. 
 
Under the Kyoto scenario, all Annex B countries are required to meet mandatory emissions 
reduction targets. Given that these countries have high marginal abatement costs, complying with 
the targets places economic burden on these countries. Table 3 shows the regional Hicksian 
equivalent
20
 decomposed into the domestic, terms of trade and spillover effects. It can be seen 
that these Annex B countries experience losses of production, welfare and the terms of trade. This 
also leads to negative terms of trade and spillover effects on those developing countries which 
have no mandatory emissions reduction targets, such as the main developing regions Asia and 
                                                 
20
 We use the Hicksian equivalent measured in real income changes as utility and welfare measure. 
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China modeled in WIAGEM. These negative effects lead to production losses in these regions 
which in turn lower their emissions in comparison with the baseline scenario. The emissions 
reductions in developing countries combined with mandatory reductions in Annex B countries 
lead to global emissions reduction of 6% below the baseline levels. However, this environmental 
effectiveness in terms of higher global emissions reduction is improved under this scenario at 
considerable economic costs. There are two reasons. First, because no emission trading is allowed, 
lower cost options are not taken into account by countries with high marginal emissions 
abatement costs. Second, Russia emissions fall below the baseline emissions path as a result of 
economic disruptions, implying that its emissions reductions targets are not binding. This could 
lead to less economic losses, provided that Russia could sell surplus emissions permits on a 
global emissions permits market. However, because emissions trading is not allowed in our 
scenario, Russia cannot benefit from otherwise increased revenues from such a sale. 
 
Under the R&D scenario, Annex B nations, such as the US, the EU, Japan and Russia cooperate 
on climate control and R&D. As would be expected, R&D cooperation induce technological 
innovations that offer low cost emission abatement options in these countries. Thus, this will 
lower the compliance costs of Annex B countries and place less strong economic burden on these 
countries. This leads to an increase of GDP and a decrease in emissions for each cooperating 
Annex B country in comparison with the Kyoto scenario. As shown in Table 3, thanks to much 
improved domestic production effects, the welfare loss of cooperating Annex B nations is much 
lower under the R&D scenario than under the Kyoto scenario. However, because marginal 
abatement costs of Annex B countries are still high even with R&D cooperation and options for 
these nations to trade emissions permits are not allowed, no positive economic benefits are 
observed. It is also seen that developing countries can benefit from improved trade effects and 
spillover effects of Annex B country’s technological innovations. In the mean time, the overall 
environmental effectiveness, measured in the global emissions, is increased markedly in 
comparison with the Kyoto scenario. 
 
When climate control coalition expands to include also developing countries, a full global 
cooperation on climate control and R&D investments under the DEV&R&D scenario triggers 
environmental friendly technologies both in Annex B and non-Annex B developing countries that 
offer low cost options to reduce emissions, thus further lowering compliance costs of Annex B 
countries in comparison with the R&D scenario. This will place even less economic burden on 
developed nations and enhance economic benefits in developing nations. However, for 
developing countries the positive domestic economic effect is not dominating their economic gain, 
but still the trade and spill over effects of developed nations are. This is because the self-induced 
growth and production effects in developing countries cannot reach that large extent. Clearly, 
international trade and spillover effects are more important for developing countries. It is these 
effects that lead to an increase of welfare and GDP and a substantial reduction of GHG emissions 
in developing countries under the DEV&R&D scenario in comparison with the R&D scenario. 
 
R&D expenditure in the OECD countries in 2001, on average, accounts for 2.3% of GDP, with 
Sweden, Finland, Japan and Iceland being the only four countries whose the R&D-to-GDP ratio 
exceeds 3% (OECD, 2003). Instead of investing R&D that would have otherwise been spent on 
their turfs, we assume that Annex B countries would invest 2.5 % of their GDP in developing 
countries (DCs) via R&D under the R&D ITOD scenario. The additional R&D investment in 
developing countries triggers improved energy efficiencies and low cost emissions abatement 
options in developing countries. This leads to further emissions reductions in DCs. The resulting 
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emissions reductions in DCs are accounted in Annex B country’s emissions balance so that the 
global emissions remain the same levels as that under the Kyoto scenario.
21
 This assumption 
indicates that Annex B countries do not have binding emissions reductions but DCs have in order 
to meet the global Kyoto emissions reduction target. These binding emissions reduction targets 
lead to slightly less economic gains in DCs under the R&D ITOD scenario than under the 
DEV&R&D scenario because emissions reductions need to be met in the former scenario. On the 
other hand, these binding emissions reduction targets do not result in economic losses in DCs 
because they benefit from low cost and investment effects of Annex B countries. Furthermore, 
Annex B countries do not have binding emissions reduction targets under the R&D ITOD 
scenario as they face under the DEV&R&D scenario so that they do not suffer huge economic 
losses. This explains why DCs experience less economic gains and Annex B countries less 
economic losses in comparison with the DEV&R&D scenario. Because Annex B countries 
contribute to large part of the world wealth, the world as a whole experiences more economic 
gain under the R&D ITOD scenario than under the DEV&R&D scenario. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Climate change is a global problem requiring a global response. This paper has aimed to 
investigate whether linking developing country’s cooperation on climate control with 
industrialized country’s R&D and technology transfer provides incentives for cooperation 
between industrialized and developing countries on climate control. To that end, we have 
examined the four policy scenarios using a world multi-sectoral, multi-regional trade model 
WIAGEM. The following main conclusions emerge from this analysis. 
 
First, cooperation on climate control and R&D among Annex B countries induces technological 
innovations, lowers their compliance costs and thus places less strong economic burden on these 
countries. Developing countries also benefit from improved trade effects and spillover effects of 
Annex B country’s technological innovations. Moreover, the overall global environmental 
effectiveness is increased markedly in comparison with the Kyoto scenario. 
 
Second, when climate control coalition expands to include also developing countries, a full global 
cooperation on climate control and R&D investments under the DEV&R&D scenario further 
lowers compliance costs of Annex B countries and places even less economic burden on 
developed countries. The trade and spillover effects of developed countries also lead to an 
increase of welfare and GDP and a substantial reduction of GHG emissions in developing 
countries in comparison with the R&D scenario. This further improves the overall global 
environmental effectiveness. 
 
Finally, our paper has examined economic and environmental implications of Annex B countries 
investing 2.5 % of their GDP, which would have otherwise been spent on their turfs, in 
developing countries via R&D under the R&D ITOD scenario, with the resulting emissions 
reductions in DCs accounted in Annex B country’s emissions balance so that the global emissions 
remain the same levels as that under the Kyoto scenario. Our results show that the additional 
R&D investment leads to further emissions reductions in DCs. Although DCs experience slightly 
less economic gains under the R&D ITOD scenario than under the DEV&R&D scenario, they 
                                                 
21
 Otherwise it would be difficult to explain why Annex B countries have any incentives to invest in R&D in DCs. 
 16 
benefit from low cost and investment effects of Annex B countries. In the mean time, with the 
emissions constraints relaxed for Annex B countries, they gain even more. Because Annex B 
countries contribute to large part of the world wealth, the world as a whole experiences more 
economic gain under the R&D ITOD scenario than under the DEV&R&D scenario. 
 
All in all, linking developing country’s cooperation on climate control with industrialized 
country’s R&D and technology transfer would be win-win-win outcomes for both developing 
countries and industrialized countries and for the global environment.
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Figure 2  Global emissions (million tons of carbon) 
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Kyoto  
 
  
R&D 
    DEV+R&D     
  HEV Domestic ToT Spillover   HEV Domestic ToT Spillover   HEV Domestic ToT Spillover 
JPN -0,0874 -0,0624 -0,0128 
-0,0121 JPN -0,0660 -0,0338 -0,0141 -0,0181 JPN -0,0515 -0,0264 -0,0110 -0,0141 
CHN -0,0147 0,0000 -0,0044 
-0,0103 CHN -0,0054 0,0000 -0,0017 -0,0037 CHN 0,0841 0,0104 0,0347 0,0390 
USA 
-0,0874 
-0,0685 
-0,0129 -0,0060 USA -0,0614 -0,0412 -0,0142 -0,0060 USA -0,0212 -0,0143 -0,0049 -0,0021 
SSA 
-0,0314 
0,0000 
-0,0005 -0,0309 SSA -0,0287 0,0000 -0,0004 -0,0283 SSA 0,0125 0,0002 0,0005 0,0118 
ROW 
-0,0412 
0,0000 
-0,0186 -0,0226 ROW -0,0384 0,0000 -0,0158 -0,0226 ROW 0,0115 0,0002 0,0044 0,0069 
CAN 
-0,0547 
-0,0444 
-0,0081 -0,0022 CAN -0,0247 -0,0176 -0,0031 -0,0040 CAN -0,0127 -0,0091 -0,0016 -0,0021 
EU15 
-0,1247 
-0,0805 
-0,0392 -0,0049 EU15 -0,0260 -0,0133 -0,0107 -0,0020 EU15 -0,0184 -0,0094 -0,0076 -0,0014 
REC 
0,0047 
0,0006 
0,0012 0,0030 REC 0,0125 0,0002 0,0027 0,0096 REC 0,0115 0,0001 0,0025 0,0089 
LSA 
-0,0412 
0,0000 
-0,0283 -0,0129 LSA -0,0152 0,0000 -0,0114 -0,0038 LSA 0,0708 0,0013 0,0492 0,0203 
ASIA 
-0,0612 
0,0000 
-0,0480 -0,0132 ASIA -0,0372 0,0000 -0,0313 -0,0059 ASIA 0,0528 0,0130 0,0165 0,0233 
MIDE 
-0,0145 
0,0000 
-0,0114 -0,0031 MIDE -0,0057 0,0000 -0,0047 -0,0011 MIDE 0,0995 0,0235 0,0538 0,0222 
MEX 
-0,0314 
0,0000 
-0,0215 -0,0099 MEX -0,0125 0,0000 -0,0089 -0,0036 MEX 0,0226 0,0036 0,0118 0,0072 
 
R&DITOD     
      HEV      Domestic                  ToT    Spillover 
JPN 0,0146 0,0031 0,0036 0,0078 
CHN 0,0478 0,0059 0,0197 0,0222 
USA 0,0275 0,0068 0,0064 0,0144 
SSA 0,0174 0,0002 0,0007 0,0165 
ROW 0,0159 0,0003 0,0061 0,0095 
CAN -0,0084 -0,0043 -0,0010 -0,0031 
EU15 0,0125 0,0034 0,0051 0,0039 
REC 0,0112 0,0001 0,0024 0,0087 
LSA 0,0841 0,0016 0,0585 0,0241 
ASIA 0,0852 0,0126 0,0266 0,0460 
MIDE 0,0985 0,0181 0,0533 0,0271 
MEX 0,0584 0,0073 0,0306 0,0206 
 
Table 3  Changes in regional Hicksian equivalent decomposed into domestic, terms of trade (ToT) and spillover effects relative to baseline levels 
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Figure 3  Percentage changes in GDP relative to baseline levels in 2010  
Figure 4  Percentage changes in GDP relative to baseline levels in 2020 
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Figure 5  Percentage changes in GDP relative to baseline levels in 2030 
 
 
 
Figure 6  Percentage changes in GDP relative to baseline level in 2040 
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Figure 7  Percentage changes in GDP relative to baseline levels in 2050 
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Appendix: Mathematical Description of Endogenous Technological Change 
 
This section briefly describes the mathematical formulation of endogenous technological 
change. Goods are produced for the domestic and export market. Production of the energy 
aggregate is described by a CES function reflecting substitution possibilities for different 
fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas, and oil), capital, and labor representing trade off effects with a 
constant substitution elasticity. Fossil fuels are produced from fuel-specific resources and the 
non-energy macro good subject to a CES technology. Energy efficiency is improved 
endogenously by increased expenditures on R&D. That means (in the CES production 
function) energy productivity is endogenously influenced by changes in R&D expenditures. 
The CES production structure follows the concept of ETA-MACRO combining nested capital 
and labor at lower levels. Energy is treated as a substitute of a capital labor composite 
determining (together with material inputs) overall output. Energy productivity is increased 
endogenously by increased R&D expenditures. 
The representative producer of sector j ascertains the CES profit function  
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   (1.1) 
with: 
:DMja  Domestic production share of total production by sector j 
:Kja   Value share of capital within capital-energy composite 
L
ja : Value share of labor within capital-energy-labor aggregate 
:Mja  Value share of material within capital-energy-labor material aggregate 
pj :  Price of domestic good j 
p
FX
:  Price of foreign exchange (exchange rate) 
p
RK
:  Price of capital 
:Ejp  Price of energy 
:Mjp  Price of material/land 
p
L
:  Price of labor 
KE: Substitution elasticity between capital and energy 
KEL: Substitution elasticity between labor, capital, and energy composite 
KLEM: Substitution elasticity between material and labor, capital, and energy composite 
Y: Activity level of production sector j 
CET: Constant elasticity of transformation  
CES: Constant elasticity of substitution  
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,
E
j tEP : Endogenous energy productivity 
With 
, , ,&
E E
j t j t j tEP KR D

   as increase of energy productivity. R&D expenditures (KR&D) 
improve innovations in more energy efficient technologies.
22
  determines the efficiency of 
research and development. This share is endogenously determined by production changes of 
cooperating countries: E
tcoopj
E
tcoopj Y ,,  . Knowledge spillover effects from cooperating to non 
cooperating countries are considered by capital flows: 
E
tcoopnon
E
tcoopjnon
E
tcoopjnon CAPFLOWY ,,,   . 
Capital is used for production with a capital price 
K
tp  and a utility price of 
RK
tp , and is 
depreciated by rate : 
1( ) (1 )
K K RK K r
t t t t tp p p p ptc       -pR&Dt      (1.2) 
with: 
K
tp : Price of capital in period t 
RK
tp : Price of capital services in period t 
r
tptc :  Price of regional protection costs 
pR&Dt:Price of regional R&D investments 
Kt: Activity level of capital in period t 
Investments are produced by Leontief technology: 
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t papPp ,11 )(         (1.3) 
I
ja  Value share investment of good j 
It: Activity level of investments in period t 
P:  Time period 
R&D investments follow the same determination 
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WIAGEM includes four energy production sectors, one non-energy sector and three fossil fuel 
sectors traded internationally for oil, gas and coal. Coal production in the OECD and gas 
production in Russia grow with energy demand at constant prices. The elasticity of 
                                                 
22
 We follow the theoretic and applied approaches of Goulder and Mathai (2000), Buonanno, Carraro et al. 
(2000) and Nordhaus (1997). 
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substitution between the resource input and non-energy inputs is calibrated to meet a given 
price elasticity of supply. Exhaustion leads to rising fossil fuel prices at constant demand 
quantities. The carbon-free backstop technology establishes an upper boundary on the world 
oil price; this backstop fuel is a perfect substitute for the three fossil fuels and is available in 
infinite supply at one price calculated to be a multiple of the world oil price in the benchmark 
year. Demand elasticities depend on backstop technologies when low backstop cost demand 
elasticities are high and vice versa. 
A composite energy good is produced by either conventional fossil fuels - oil, gas, and coal – 
represented by a nested CES technology (with an elasticity of interfuel substitution fuel) or 
from a backstop source with Leontief technology structures. Oil and gas can be substituted by 
an elasticity of substitution twice as large as the elasticity between their aggregate and coal. 
The energy good production is determined by industry and household final demand. 
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With: 
ELE
ja  Electricity value share of energy aggregate by sector j 
OIL
ja  Oil value share of fossil energy aggregate by sector j 
GAS
ja  Gas value share of fossil energy aggregate by sector j 
HCO
ja  Hard coal value share of coal aggregate by sector j 
SCO
ja  Soft coal value share of coal aggregate by sector j 
ELE Substitution elasticity between electricity and fossil energy 
FOSSIL Substitution elasticity between fossil energy inputs 
COA: Substitution elasticity between hard and soft coal 
p
ET 
Price emissions permits  
Ej Activity level of energy production 
CARBLIMj Sectoral GHG emissions 
 
 
 
 
 
